Globalism Primer Part 00: The Westphalian Peace versus Contingent Sovereignty

This entry begins a series of posts in which I will outline the general themes of globalism.


The the doctrine of contingent sovereignty is an innovation of thought in the conduct and rules of foreign policy which directly attacks the many-years-old idea of the Westphalian-style organization of nation states.

Westphalian sovereignty
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of nation-state sovereignty based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures.

Many academics have asserted that the international system of states, multinational corporations and organizations which exists today began in 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia.[1] Both the basis and the result of this view have been attacked by revisionist academics and politicians alike, with revisionists questioning the significance of the Peace, and commentators and politicians attacking the Westphalian System of sovereign nation-states.

Traditional view

Adherents to the concept of a Westphalian system trace it back to the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648, in which, it is claimed, the major European powers agreed to abide by the principle of territorial integrity. In the Westphalian system, the interests and goals of nation-states were widely assumed to transcend those of any individual citizen or even any ruler.

The Peace of Westphalia is said to have ended attempts at the imposition of any supranational authority on European states. The "Westphalian" doctrine of states as independent actors was bolstered by the rise in 19th century thought of nationalism, under which legitimate states were assumed to correspond to nations—groups of people united by language and culture. Benedict Anderson refers to these putative nations as "imagined communities."

The Westphalian system reached its apogee in the late 19th century. Although practical considerations still led powerful states to seek to influence the affairs of others, forcible intervention by one country in the domestic affairs of another was less frequent in the period between 1850 and 1900 than in most previous and subsequent periods (Leurdijk 1986).

The Peace of Westphalia is crucially important to modern international relations theory, with the Peace often being defined as the beginning of the international system with which the discipline deals.[2][3][4]

International relations theorists have identified the Peace of Westphalia as having several key principles, which explain the Peace's significance and its impact on the world today:

1. The principle of the sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self determination
2. The principle of (legal) equality between states
3. The principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state

These principles are common to the way the "realist" international relations paradigm views the international system today, which explains why the system of states is referred to as "The Westphalian System".

Both the idea of Westphalian sovereignty and its applicability in practice have been questioned from the mid-20th century onwards from a variety of viewpoints. Much of the debate has turned on the ideas of internationalism and globalization which, in various interpretations, appear to conflict with Westphalian sovereignty.

A notable defence of Westphalian sovereignty is to be found in John Rawls' 1999 book, A Law of Peoples.

Against the non-interventionist Westphalian-style organization of nation-states stands the doctrine of interventionist-leaning contingent sovereignty.

Contingent sovereignty refers to the new and still evolving theory which challenges the norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of countries, commonly associated with the Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty.

Stewart Patrick of the United States State Department has described the contingent sovereignty as follows.

Historically, the main obstacle to armed intervention -humanitarian or otherwise- has been the doctrine of sovereignty, which prohibits violating the territorial integrity of another state. One of the striking developments of the past decade has been an erosion of this non-intervention norm and the rise of a nascent doctrine of “contingent sovereignty.”
This school of thought holds that sovereign rights and immunities are not absolute. They depend on the observance of fundamental state obligations. These include the responsibility to protect the citizens of the state. When a regime makes war on its people or cannot prevent atrocities against them, it risks forfeiting its claim to non-intervention. In such circumstances, the responsibility to protect may devolve to the international community.
This emerging consensus reflects the traumas of the twentieth century. The seminal event was the Holocaust, but it was hardly the last to shock the conscience of humankind. From the killing fields of Cambodia to the bloody hills of Rwanda, a litany of atrocities has mocked our earnest, repeated pledges of 'Never Again.'
Following the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan described what he termed a "developing international norm ... that massive and systematic violations of human rights wherever they may take place ... should not be allowed to stand." No longer should frontiers be considered an absolute defense behind which states can commit crimes against humanity with "sovereign impunity."

With regard to the doctrine of contingent sovereignty, an innovation of thinking has occured in which the concept of "global felonies" has emerged as a list of posited violations of international morality which result in the forfeiture of a nation's claim to sovereignty. This issue was discussed briefly over at Cobb in the context of a list of international violations which have been termed "global felonies" by Christopher Hitchens.

Global Felonies

From Christopher Hitchens

Essentially, there are four such criteria. One is genocide, which, according to the signatories of the Genocide Convention (the United States is one), necessitates immediate action either to prevent or to punish the perpetrators. Another is aggression against the sovereignty of neighboring states, including occupation of their territory. A third is hospitality for, or encouragement of, international terrorist groups, and a fourth is violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty or of U.N. resolutions governing weapons of mass destruction.

(c.f. Least Favored Nation)

It occured to me that Cobb's "least favored nation" concept was essentially another iteration of the doctrine of contingent sovereignty.

I think the "least favored nation" concept is somewhat premised upon the doctrine of contingent sovereignty which directly attacks the many-years-old idea of the Westphalian-style organization of nation states. It uses a list of posited intolerable violations of supra-national "international" standards as the basis of resolutions declaring the automatic forfeiture of a nation's claim to national sovereignty resulting in eventual humanitarian/military intervention.

Cobb didn't agree at first.

I very much dislike the theory of contingent sovereignty and I don't see any body capable of establishing it with any consistency worthy of military backing.

Instead I see that national arrangements and treaties are sufficiently mature, and the business interests of nations and trade blocs sufficiently mature to legally justify causus belli. The idea that a supra-national authority is required to establish causus belli is, in my opinion, wishful thinking.

I pointed out that the case for contingent sovereignty had been previously enumerated very succinctly by Richard Hass. I don't know of a better explication of the principles of contingent sovereignty than Hass' op-ed.

thegrayconservative said...

It's a mistake to believe that the theory of contingent sovereignty is limited to those issues which require military backing for the purpose of humanitarian/military intervention. Key redefinitions of the Westphalian-style organization of nations states have already taken places in the areas of trade, climate change, and the war on terrorism.

I'll remind you here that the idea of contingent sovereignty has been previously enumerated in detail by Hass and certainly encompasses more than just these four small violations listed by Hitchens. The list of "global felonies" which are said to be causes for the forfeiture of sovereignty is much longer than four, and even though you may not like the idea, it nevertheless seems that Hitchens' "global felonies" and your least favored nation concept both fix neatly into the framework.

Our notion of sovereignty must therefore be conditional, even contractual, rather than absolute.. If a state fails to live up to its side of the bargain by sponsoring terrorism, either transferring or using weapons of mass destruction, or conducting genocide, then it forfeits the normal benefits of sovereignty and opens itself up to attack, removal or occupation. The diplomatic challenge for this era is to gain widespread support for principles of state conduct and a procedure for determining remedies when these principles are violated.

Compare with:

I'm going to submit five countries onto the international shitlist in advance of Hilary Clinton. I pretty much know what she's likely to say but still, just in case she doesn't. The following are the nations who should be clutching their 'nads in fear of American aggression.

Violations of international principles of state conduct will thus gain a nation a spot on the "international shitlist" resulting in aggression, removal, or occupation. The structure of the arguments here are very similar.

Note also that Hitchens makes explicit mention of a state's ability to contain and manage germs and pandemics in relation to Zimbabwe. This is yet another posited violation which fits neatly into an accusation of a state's inability to "live up to its side of the bargain" in the form of what he calls a "germ warfare of a kind". This pillar of the contingent sovereignty theory can be understood through a series of keywords which are crucial to the failed state narrative: genocide, refugees, borders, and destabilization.

Necessity may also lead to reducing or even eliminating sovereignty when a government, whether from a lack of capacity or conscious policy, is unable to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. This reflects not simply scruples, but a view that state failure and genocide can lead to destabilising refugee flows and create openings for terrorists to take root.

Compare with:

The situation has altered recently, however, and an examination of what has altered may help us to clarify when a state crosses the boundary from "failed" to "rogue." So great is the misery of the Zimbabwean people that acute diseases like cholera are now rife. And such is their degree of desperation that they have started crossing the frontier en masse, chiefly in the direction of South Africa, taking their maladies with them. This means that Mugabe has made himself an international problem, destabilizing his neighbors and thus giving them a direct legitimate interest in (and a right to concern themselves with) the restabilizing of Zimbabwe. If the voices of people like Desmond Tutu and Graça Machel, who are beginning to insist that regional action be taken to remove Mugabe, are ever heard properly, it will probably be because Mugabe went too far in driving infected people onto the territory of the countries next door. This is germ warfare of a kind.

It's not a coincidence that Hitchens likens the situation in Zimbabwe to "germ warfare".

The "global felonies" which are touched upon here are only a handful of violations that in reality comprise an entire compendium of posited international violations which are crucial to the "what-ever-shall-we-do-with-failed states" narrative and whose proponents are always invariably in favor of an interventionist approach which frames any and everything in terms of "thinking globally". Hence the choice of the name, "global" felonies; and "global" warming; and the "global" economy. (cf. also the "global kids" initiative.) All four of Hitchens' violations are posited justifications for the forfeiture of sovereignty under this internationalist rubric. Add to that four a whole host of other posited would-be axiomatic principles of foreign policy phrased as a threat matrix of international no-no's which are enumerated with great clarity by the smart people at the CFR and interventionists like Hitchens and yourself.

Sudan, Pakistan, North Korea, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. You claim to not like the idea of contingent sovereignty, but the five nations you singled out for intervention in the "Obama Gonna What?" entry, coupled with the reasons you listed for American intervention in those areas, is a clear example of the type of innovation in thinking which holds that sovereignty no longer provides absolute protection. You, Hass, and Hitchens are very much on the same page:

Globalisation thus implies that sovereignty is not only becoming weaker in reality, but that it needs to become weaker. States would be wise to weaken sovereignty in order to protect themselves, because they cannot insulate themselves from what goes on elsewhere. Sovereignty is no longer a sanctuary.

This was demonstrated by the American and world reaction to terrorism. Afghanistan’s Taliban government, which provided access and support to al-Qaeda, was removed from power. Similarly, America’s preventive war against an Iraq that ignored the UN and was thought to possess weapons of mass destruction showed that sovereignty no longer provides absolute protection. Imagine how the world would react if some government were known to be planning to use or transfer a nuclear device or had already done so. Many would argue correctly that sovereignty provides no protection for that state.

The counter argument to the interventionist theory of contingent sovereignty is that even well-intentioned intervention has unintended consequences and blowback. Whereas the Peace of Westphalia upheld "the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state" as standard operating procedure, the new internationalism is a fundamentally interventionist enterprise which is bracketed by the revisionist interpretations of the Peace and the theory of contingent sovereignty that goes along with it.